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The Stakes of Spinoza’s Language: A Moderate Necessitarian Understanding of Ethics and 
Spinoza’s Conception of Freedom as Both Positive and Negative Liberty 
 The philosophic tradition is wrought with varying conceptions of human freedom, but 
few are as unique as that of Benedict Spinoza.  In Spinoza’s Ethics conventional philosophic 
notions of freedom are problematized by the philosopher’s deterministic system in which all 
happenings necessarily follow from the mind of God and, thus, must necessarily happen exactly 
as they do.  This determinism disallows colloquially understood and commonly accepted notions 
such as freedom of the will.  Instead, Spinoza’s conception of freedom involves affirming truth 
through the activity of the human intellect, which is accomplished by forming in the mind what 
Spinoza calls “clear and distinct perceptions” or “adequate ideas” of things.  Like the majority of 
the philosophical tradition Spinoza lauds reason, believing that through the exercise of the 
faculty of reason human beings have the power to make themselves more perfect or, in Spinozian 
terms, more like God.  In so doing the individual may check or limited the influence that external 
things, that is, things which cannot be understood through our own nature (which is a reflection 
of the divine nature), have on our actions. This disburdening of the self from the inhibiting 
influence of the external is what constitutes freedom in Spinoza’s system.  This aforementioned 
conception of freedom is complicated and demands an understanding of other key elements of 
his philosophy to be understood completely, which I endeavor to provide herein.  Ultimately, the 
first section of this paper will illuminate what Spinoza means when he speaks of human freedom.  
I will show specifically how Spinoza conceives of freedom in a liberatory sense, arguing that the 
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free man is he who perceives truth clearly and distinctly, thereby enabling him to check and 
control his emotional responses to the external world in an effort to maximize his human 
potential.  In this sense, Spinoza’s conception of freedom appears to represent a form of 
“positive liberty,” or, “the possibility of acting in such a way as to take control of one’s life” 
(Carter).  Nonetheless, one will come to see how, when considering an alternative understanding 
of the language of the Ethics, there is also room to argue that Spinoza tacitly endorses a form of 
“negative liberty.” 
 Once this initial investigation is completed and we have firmly established what Spinoza 
intends when he refers to human freedom, I will expand my investigation, in the second section 
of this paper, to illuminate the contemporary scholarly debate concerning the true stakes of 
Spinoza’s determinism.  This debate focuses whether or not Spinoza’s logic implies a strict or 
moderate necessitarianism (that is, whether the Ethics allows for one possible world or many 
plausible ones).  The specifics of this debate, as one will come to see, depend on differing 
readings of Propositions 16 and 28 of Part I of the Ethics.  Ultimately, the debate hinges on an 
understanding of the implied relationship between finite and infinite modes, for those who 
believe that Spinoza’s finite modes are not directly affected by God’s determinism endorse, 
either tacitly or directly, a moderate necessitarian reading of Spinoza.  Nevertheless, it seems as 
though Spinoza himself numbered among those of the strict necessitarian camp.  All of this will 
be explained at length in the second section, after which I will defend my own position as a 
moderate necessitarian, as well as my justification for why one could make the case that 
Spinoza’s freedom represents an example of “negative liberty,” in the paper’s third and final 
section of this paper.  In the meantime, however, it behooves us to begin our investigation of 
Spinoza’s conception of human freedom. 
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Section I: Fleshing Out Spinoza’s Notion of Human Freedom as Potential Positive Liberty 
 Any fruitful discussion concerning Spinoza’s notion of freedom first necessitates an 
understanding of his conceptions of God and determinism, for his unique understanding of 
freedom is bound up in these aforementioned ideas.  Spinoza labors in Part I of the Ethics to 
establish God as the only true substance, or “that which is in itself and conceived through itself; 
that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing…” (Ethics 
217).   Furthermore, Spinoza contends that, owing to the divine nature, God is self-caused, the 
first cause, and the efficient cause of all things (Spinoza 227).  This is absolutely crucial to an 
understanding of Spinoza’s determinism, for what follows from the above propositions is the 
belief that “God acts solely from the necessity of his own nature” (Spinoza 228). We understand 
this to be true because, owing to the demands Spinoza makes of “substance,” there could be no 
other substance which limits God in any capacity.  Acting solely from his own nature, which 
being infinite may express itself in infinite ways, God necessarily manifests all extended things 
in the form of either attributes or modes.  From this point Spinoza contends, in the corollary of 
Part I proposition 25, that “Particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God, 
that is, modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and determinate way” 
(Spinoza 232).  Human beings, being themselves particular things, are therefore determined to 
express themselves in particular ways.  Spinoza makes this point in Part I proposition 29 when 
he writes, “Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine 
nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way” (Spinoza 234).  Finally, Spinoza 
explicitly acknowledges the deterministic worldview in Part I proposition 33, writing, “Things 
could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than is the case” 
(Spinoza 236).  If anything was to behave differently it would imply that God’s nature, which is 
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the necessarily perfect efficient cause of all things, could have been different and, therefore, 
imperfect, which is logically absurd. 
 While this may seem like a cursory overview of Spinoza’s very complex cosmology, it is 
sufficient for our purposes insofar as it illuminates what is meant when we speak of determinism.  
It also sufficiently demonstrates why colloquial conceptions of human freedom don’t work for 
Spinoza.  If we are determined to act in a definite way, and cannot act in any other way, how can 
we be said to be free?  A free will demands that the individual agent have complete autonomy 
over his actions, which the nature of the aforementioned system renders impossible.  This is not 
to say that Spinoza denies the existence of “will,” but only that Spinoza’s conception of “will” is, 
like everything else, under the thumb of God’s determinism.  Nevertheless, Spinoza does not 
lament the loss of free will.  Instead he embraces an entirely different conception of freedom 
which stems from intellect’s ability to possess knowledge of the divine nature and to act only in 
accordance with this knowledge.  It is in this way that man may lead a rational life which, for 
Spinoza, “the highest happiness and blessedness for mankind consists in alone.” (Spinoza 358).  
Through the rational power of the intellect man may free himself, to a greater or lesser degree, 
from the influence of external things and, instead, condition himself to act in accordance with the 
divine nature itself as understood through the mind.  This freedom, which the scholar Eva 
Piirimäe identifies as “positive freedom,” or “freedom from” as opposed to “freedom to,” will 
henceforth be the subject of my investigation (Piirimäe 355). 
 Freedom, for Spinoza, is realized in the act of liberating oneself from the bondage of the 
passions, which can only be effected through the forming of what he calls clear and distinct ideas 
of the nature of God.  Understanding that we are determined to act by the necessity of God (or 
Nature), Spinoza argues, “and that we share in the divine nature… our actions become more 
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perfect as we understand God more and more” (Spinoza 276).  The belief that man is slave to the 
passions is deeply entrenched in the philosophic tradition and Spinoza, consistent with many of 
his predecessors, argues that it is in the best interest of man’s continued well-being and self-
preservation to liberate himself from these oppressive emotions, especially the sad emotions.  In 
the Preface to Part III of the Ethics Spinoza considers the mistaken manner in which some men 
regard human emotions.  “Most of those who have written about the emotions,” he writes, “and 
human conduct seem to be dealing not with natural phenomena that follow the common laws of 
Nature but with phenomena outside Nature” (Spinoza 277).  These men erroneously assume that 
negative emotions (hatred, envy, anger, etc…) are the product of some flaw in the nature of 
things.  Spinoza, on the other hand, contends that “in Nature nothing happens which can be 
attributed to its defectiveness,” so it follows that “the emotions of hatred, anger, envy etc… 
follow from the same necessity and force of Nature as all other particular things… these 
emotions are assignable to definite causes through which they can be understood” (Spinoza 278).  
“Understanding” is the key take-away here, as it is through understanding the passions, that is, 
forming adequate or clear and distinct ideas concerning the causes of the passions, that we may 
eventually control the degree to which negative emotions, such as pain and its derivations, inhibit 
our body’s power of activity.  In this manner (which will be explained more succinctly below), 
we thereby make ourselves more free. 
Spinoza considers active and passive states of the mind thusly: the former being the state 
at which we recognize ourselves as the adequate cause of something, that is, when something is 
understood through our nature alone, and the latter being that state at we are constituted in 
relation to something external to ourselves.  The emotions, insofar as they are the product of our 
being affected by external bodies, are necessarily passive.  It must be noted, however, that not all 
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emotions are the product of an external constitution.  Pain, pleasure, and desire, he argues, are 
the three primary emotions which are part of our fundamental nature (Spinoza 284).  We can 
form clear and distinct perceptions of these three emotions because we can have adequate ideas 
of our own nature, but we cannot, according to Spinoza, form adequate ideas of things external 
to ourselves.  All other emotions, Spinoza claim in proposition 56 of Part III, manifest insofar as 
“we are affected in a way that involves both the nature of our own body and the nature of an 
external body” (Spinoza 307).  In short, there are innumerable kinds of pleasure and pain, which 
are the product of one of the aforementioned emotions being bound up in the idea of an external 
body.  Because Spinoza has already noted in proposition 3 of Part III that “active states of the 
mind arise only from adequate ideas” and “passive states depend solely on inadequate ideas,” we 
understand that the emotions which are inexorably linked to the idea of external bodies, which 
we can form only inadequate ideas of, necessarily must render the mind passive (Spinoza 282).  
This is problematic because it is in the essence of the mind’s conatus, or the inherent and natural 
desire to “persist in one’s own being,” to “endeavor to think only of the things that affirm its 
power of activity” (Spinoza 306).  This is where Spinoza allows for some wiggle room in his 
otherwise determinate universe.  
The conatus is the fundamental property of the human essence, and that which increases 
the body’s capacity to act, which is consistent with the drive of the conatus, is what Spinoza 
considers to be good.  The opposite is also true, for whatever inhibits the body’s capacity for 
action Spinoza regards as evil.  It follows, then, that the emotions of pleasure and pain affect the 
conatus in a profound way.  “Pleasure,” writes Spinoza in proposition 41 of Part IV, “is not in 
itself bad, but good.  On the other hand, pain is in itself bad” (Spinoza 343).  This is because 
“pleasure is an emotion whereby the body’s power of activity is increased” and “pain is an 
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emotion whereby the body’s power of activity is diminished” (Spinoza 343).  The free man, then, 
is he who, insofar as it is possible, enjoys feelings of pleasure and minimizes feelings of pain.  
Spinoza makes this point clear in the appendix to Part IV when he writes, “Whatsoever in nature 
we deem evil, that is, capable of hindering us from being able to enjoy a rational life, it is 
permissible for us to remove… On the other hand, whatever we deem good, that is, advantageous 
for preserving our own being… it is permissible for us to take for our use and to use it as we 
please” (Spinoza 359).  A free man is able to appropriate the passive emotions which produce 
pleasure, for these are in his interest to preserve as they render him more active, while, at the 
same time, diminishing those that cause him pain. This can be achieved only through the 
formation of adequate ideas, for it is through the mind that we may better understand the external 
causes of the emotions which passively act upon us.  Because the mind, in forming adequate 
ideas, becomes active, the formation of adequate ideas regarding pain helps to diminish the pain.  
This point is clarified in the following analogy.  Spinoza writes in proposition 48 of Part III that 
“Love and hatred towards Peter are destroyed if the pain involved in the latter and the pleasure 
involved in the former are associated with the idea of a different cause; and both emotions are 
diminished to the extent that we think Peter not to have been the only cause of either emotion” 
(Spinoza 302).  When we recognize that the external body in question is not the only cause of 
our emotions, and that we, ourselves, are an adequate cause of them, we may diminish the power 
the passions have over us and our actions.  It so doing we liberate ourselves from the bondage of 
the passions. 
Early in Part IV Spinoza argues that “the power whereby each single thing, and 
consequently man, preserves its own being is the very power of God, or Nature, not insofar as it 
is infinite but insofar as it can be explicated through actual human essence” (Spinoza 324).  
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Conversely, Spinoza here suggests that human essence is synonymous with power.  Man is most 
fit to satisfy his conatus when he can explain the cause of his actions and emotions by achieving 
an adequate understanding of the divine nature.  In this manner he may also achieve the ends 
listed above, namely, an embrace of the positive emotions and a disregard for the negative.  For 
Spinoza this constitutes human virtue.  Spinoza illuminates this point in the 23rd and 24th 
propositions of Part IV when he writes, “”Insofar as a man is determined to some action from the 
fact that he has inadequate ideas, he cannot be said… to be acting from virtue; he can be said to 
do so only insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands,” and, “to act in absolute 
conformity with virtue is nothing else in us but to act, to live, to preserve one’s own being (these 
three mean the same) under the guidance of reason… according to the laws of one’s own nature” 
(Spinoza 334).  This is where Spinoza brings the discussion back to emotions, writing in 
proposition 32 of Part IV that, “insofar as men are subject to passive emotions, to that extent 
they cannot be said to agree in nature” (Spinoza 336).  In Part IV of the Ethics Spinoza finally 
explains how freedom is achieved.  “If we remove an agitation of the mind, or emotion, from the 
thought of its external cause,” he writes in proposition 2, “then love and hatred towards the 
external cause that arise from these emotions will be destroyed” (Spinoza 365).  Love and hatred 
are merely pleasure and pain “accompanied by the idea of an external cause,” so when the 
emotion is divorced from the external cause all that remains are pleasure and pain.  We can form 
adequate ideas of these emotions, and, insofar as we may form such ideas the emotions cease to 
be passive and instead become active.  Now because we lack the capacity to form adequate ideas 
about emotions constituted in relation to external things, such emotions hinder our mind from 
understanding, which is bad and contrary to our nature.  Nonetheless, “as long as we are not 
assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the power of the mind whereby it endeavors to 
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understand things is not hindered… in this case we have the ability to arrange and associate 
affections of the body according to the order of the intellect” (Spinoza 369).  Here Spinoza 
references his “doctrine of parallelism” laid out in Proposition 7 of Part II of Ethics which reads, 
“The order and connection of idea is the same as the order and connection of things” (247).  If 
we can arrange the body in accordance with the perfect working of the intellect, which 
understands the cause of bad emotions and, if properly emendated, reflects the divine mind, “we 
can bring it about that we are not easily affected by bad emotions” (Spinoza 369).  In removing 
bad emotions and appropriating good ones, we condition ourselves to act only in accordance 
with those things that we have adequate ideas of, that is, things that increase our capacity for 
action and thus satisfy the inherent drive of the conatus.  We achieve blessedness insofar as we 
act in accordance with the divine nature which we recognize in our own, human nature.  Finally, 
we achieve freedom in divorcing the passions from their external causes, thereby attaining the 
ability to perceive them clearly and distinctly as an affection of the human mind alone. 
Spinoza concludes his Ethics with a final proposition which reads, in part, “Blessedness 
is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself” (Spinoza 382).  Virtue is its own reward, for it 
empowers us to understand and check the negative passions which would otherwise motivate us 
to act in a manner contrary to our own self-preservation… our own conatus.  Man achieves 
freedom insofar as he is capable of forming adequate ideas concerning the nature of the emotions 
which are, when divorced of their relation to external things, recognized to arise from his own 
essence.  This is the act of an emotion becoming active and ceasing to be passive.  With this I 
have shown what Spinoza’s conception of human freedom is.  The aforementioned constitutes 
what Spinoza intended his deterministic universe to both look like and entail.  I say intended, 
because there is a great deal of contemporary debate concerning whether Spinoza actually 
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succeeded in describing the logical system that he envisioned.  In the following section I explore 
the two rival positions of this debate at length.  In doing so I hope to establish a both illuminate 
the respective positions and enable my own critique in the third section. 
Section II: Concerning Moderate vs. Strict Necessitarian Readings of Spinoza’s Ethics 
Now that one is familiar with Spinoza’s conception of human freedom, what we have 
considered as a form of positive freedom, it comes time to turn our attention to another key and 
problematic concept in Spinoza’s metaphysics that has inspired a great deal of critical, 
philosophic debate.  I am speaking here of the debate over Spinoza’s necessitarianism, or, more 
specifically, whether or not Spinoza was a necessitarian in the strict sense, or whether he was a 
moderate / conditional necessitarian.  Christopher Martin makes this distinction when he writes, 
“strict necessitarianism is the view that whatever is actual is necessary, that there is only one 
possible world,” while moderate necessitarianism, on the other hand, “holds that the state of the 
world at any moment is necessary given the past and the laws of nature, and that the laws of 
nature could not have been otherwise, but that the series of events that actually unfold is not the 
only possible series” (Martin 26).  The debate over to which camp Spinoza belongs generally 
depends on how one understands the metaphysical relation in Spinoza’s Ethics between 
“infinite” and “finite” modes, and substance.  These different understandings are anchored in 
antithetical readings of Proposition 16 of Volume 1 of Ethics which reads: “From the necessity 
of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite ways [modis] (that is, everything 
that can come within the scope of infinite intellect)” (Spinoza 227).  Strict necessitarians, such as 
Olli Koistinen, hold that the aforementioned proposition implies that both infinite and finite 
modes must manifest and follow necessarily exactly as they do from God’s infinite nature 
(Koistinen 286).  Moderate necessitarians, such as Martin, contend instead that “The finite 
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modes of substance are deterministic but not necessary, showing that Spinoza is a moderate but 
not strict necessitarian” (Martin 26).  This section will examine and extrapolate upon both of 
these readings of Spinoza’s Ethics.  
 In attempting to present an alternative to strict necessitarian readings of Spinoza Martin 
argues that “infinite modes are necessary features of substance that follow from its nature alone,” 
while “finite modes are features of substance that follow only from other finite modes; they 
follow [then] from the divine nature only in the sense that the finite modes that they follow from 
are themselves expressions of the divine nature” (Martin 27).  This is important because, if finite 
modes are dependent upon the expression of other finite modes, it is plausible that the series of 
events that constitute the universe could have been constituted in another way.  While God’s 
universe is deterministic insofar as the rules of nature (infinite modes that follow from God’s 
perfection) are immutable and necessary, the expression of finite modes could vary, thereby 
making them not necessary in the strict sense.  Spinoza allows room for this argument in 
Proposition 28 of Volume 1 when he writes, “Every individual thing which is finite and has a 
determinate existence, cannot exist or be determined to act unless it be determined to exist and to 
act by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence” (Spinoza 233).  In this 
sense, finite modes are not determined by infinite modes, but by other finite modes.  The debate 
over whether Spinoza believed in one possible world, then, hinges on the relationship between 
finite modes and substance (i.e. God) in Spinoza’s work.  Martin’s task becomes showing that 
infinite and finite modes relate to God in different ways.  “EIP16,” he acknowledges, “is 
commonly thought to be a proposition about all modes, and if commentators are right about 
this… then all modes that follow from the divine nature follow necessarily, so they could not 
have been otherwise” (34).  Nonetheless, Martin takes a different view, arguing that only infinite 
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modes are “propria” (that which follows necessarily from God’s essence or nature), while finite 
modes are not (34).  If he can sufficiently prove this, he would flip the strict necessitarian 
reading that suggests that there can be only one world following from God’s perfect nature and 
infinite intellect. 
 Martin contends that finite modes should not be considered applicable to EIP16, an 
argument substantiated by his belief that “infinite intellect comprehends infinite but not finite 
modes” (44).  To prove this he points to Spinoza’s distinction between “durational” and “eternal” 
modes of thinking, arguing that, given Spinoza’s claim in EVP21 that the mind can only 
recollect past thoughts while the body survives, there are certain durational ideas that survive 
only as long as we do, while eternal ideas, which enable the understanding of eternal truths, are 
timeless and do not depend on the endurance of the body (Martin 45).  He uses this 
understanding to show that finite modes must not follow directly from God’s nature, and 
therefore must not be considered necessary.  He refers to “knowledge of the third kind,” that is, 
knowledge that “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of 
God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things” (Martin 46).  This should be familiar to 
us, as it is what Spinoza believes delivers us from the bondage of the passions and, hence, 
constitutes human freedom.  Because this type of knowledge is what “necessarily follows from 
the essence of a substance,” and finite modes do not follow directly from substance (God) as 
infinite modes do, Martin shows the third type of knowledge is that which is understood by the 
infinite intellect “independent of the finite modal order” (46).  In so doing, Martin evidences a 
reading that suggests that finite modes do not follow necessarily from the essence of a substance, 
and, hence, should not be considered in respect to EIP16 (the proposition that has historically 
been used to justify readings of Spinoza as a strict necessitarian).  In short, “the infinite intellect 
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comprehends whatever follows from the divine nature, but does not comprehend finite modes, so 
finite modes do not follow [necessarily and directly] from the divine nature” (Martin 48). 
 Ultimately, Martin holds that his belief that EIP16 concerns only infinite modes 
problematizes traditional beliefs in a “vertical order of causation that extends from the divine 
nature all the way down to finite modes” (48).  In other words, there is a possibility for several 
plausible worlds because the ordering of finite modes in the world is not necessarily demanded 
to be one particular way by God, as they don’t follow directly from God’s nature like infinite 
modes.  It is plausible, then, for multiple worlds, that is, multiple arrangements of finite modes, 
which would not satisfy strict necessitarianism.  Furthermore, Martin points to EIP28D, 
paraphrased as saying “the only things capable of producing finite modes are other finite 
modes,” as textual evidence of his claim (49).  The aforementioned proposition, he claims, 
“treats infinite modes and finite modes as distinct ontological orders and argues that only the 
latter can be responsible for the causality of finite modes” (49-50).  Martin suggests that this 
reading is further evidenced in EIIP9 which [paraphrased] reads, “God is the cause of singular 
things ‘not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by other ideas of 
a singular thing” (Martin 50).  Here, too, we see an ontological distinction between infinite and 
finite modes.   
This is particularly where our other scholar, Olli Koistinen, in his “Spinoza’s Proof of 
Necessitarianism,” differs.  “I interpret Spinoza as a substance-property ontologist,” writes 
Koistinen, “which means that he holds that besides substances and properties there is nothing” 
(284).  Koistinen also lays out the basic metaphysical distinction Spinoza makes between infinite 
and finite modes (which are acknowledged and accepted by Martin), writing that “finite modes 
are particular things having spatio-temporal limits to their existence,” while infinite modes are, 
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on the contrary, eternal and limitless.  The key argument that distances Koistinen from Martin 
and other moderate necessitarians, however, comes when he argues that, “according to Spinoza, 
the relation between the nature of God and anything that exists is that of logical entailment… 
because Spinoza thought that God’s nature is necessarily instantiated, it follows that everything 
necessarily follows from something that necessarily exists” (Koistinen 286).  This would, of 
course, include finite modes, so Koistinen differs from Martin in the sense that he believes finite 
modes are absolutely necessary and, consequently, there could be necessarily only one world.  
This is a strict necessitarian reading.  Koistinen is, however, aware of the problem presented by 
Spinoza’s notion of finite modes and the possible readings of EIP16 and EIP28 presented at 
length above.  He refers to this problem as a “problem of causal determinism, writing, “causal 
determinism between finite things does not show that the world must have the complete history it 
has” (288).  In other words, Spinoza’s ambiguous relation between finite modes and substance 
leaves room for a reading like Martin’s, which justifiably allows for an “apparently possible 
alternative series of modes [alternative worlds] which Spinoza seems to overlook” (Koistinen 
289).  Koistinen’s job now becomes proving that, despite Spinoza’s misstep, there remains 
sufficient textual evidence to substantiate a strict necessitarian reading of Ethics. 
Like many of his strict necessitarian comrades, Koistinen bases his reading on EIP16.  
Nonetheless, he endeavors to “interpret the proof of that central proposition in such a way that it 
can been seen how necessitarianism follows from the preceding material in Ethics” (295).  When 
Koistinen here refers to “preceding material” he is referencing Spinoza’s Monism, which is 
given in EIP5.  In this way, Koistinen hopes to “offer a satisfying solution to the problem of 
apparently possible alternative series of modes” (295).  Among the arguments he entertains for 
this purpose concerns the absolute infinity of God and his perfection.  EIP16 seems to say, writes 
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Koistinen, that from the absolute infinity of God, i.e. from the fact that God has infinite attributes 
each of which express an essence infinite in its own kind, it follows that everything possibly true 
of God must be true of him (295).  Piggybacking off of the philosophical arguments of Diane 
Steinberg1, Koistinen claims that “the actualization of everything that is conceivable, or possible, 
follows from God’s being perfect” (296).  This seems logical enough, and, if accepted, it would 
support a reading of Ethics that suggests that the keystone proposition (EIP16) applies to both 
finite and infinite modes (the position rejected by Martin).  Steinberg’s point, writes Koistinen, 
“is that it is a conceptual truth that each of God’s attributes is perfect… Thus, if all possible 
modes [including finite modes] were not realized, God would not exist… [and] the infinity of 
God’s attributes requires that every possible mode of any attribute must gain actuality” 
(Koistinen 296).  This is an absolutely crucial point, for, logically, there cannot be two perfect 
worlds just as there could not be two perfect substances.  They would necessarily be the same 
and, thus, be one.  Now, if this reading of EIP16 is correct, Spinoza’s system would seemingly 
not allow the emergence of alternative series of modes, as the alternative systems would 
necessarily have to gain actuality and, because there cannot be simultaneously two or more 
conflicting worlds, the one actual and perfect world would necessarily follow from the one 
substance (God).  “In Spinoza’s system,” writes Koistinen, “the infinity of attributes guarantees 
their perfection which explains why Spinoza sees EIP16D as entailing necessitarianism.  There 
cannot be any conceivable alternative systems of finite modes: if there were, each such system 
would require its own necessarily existing substance” (299-300). 
If we accept Koistinen’s argument then he has succeeded in validating a strictly 
necessitarian reading of Ethics on the grounds that, “If besides the actual system of modes 
                                                          
1 Steinberg, D. 1981. “Spinoza’s Theory of the Eternity of the Mind’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11, 35-68. 
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another alternative system were possible or conceivable, there should be, in addition to the actual 
substance, another substance. But Spinoza’s monism excludes such a possibility” (305).  
Because Spinoza has clearly stated in EIP5 that, “In the universe there cannot be two or more 
substances of the same nature or attribute,” such a situation becomes impossible given Spinoza’s 
established metaphysics.  Ultimately, Koistinen attempts to show that, despite ambiguous 
verbiage in EIP16 and EIP28 relating to the causal relationship between substance and finite 
modes, there can only be one possible world insofar as the actualization or manifestation of all 
possible modes [both finite and infinite] are necessarily implied by God’s perfect nature.  Were 
they not to be actualized, God would be imperfect, which is absurd, so, thus, the actual world 
represents the one, true, and deterministic world that strict necessitarianism advocates.  
Furthermore, were several possible worlds [or several possible expressions of finite modes] to 
exists, there would have to be several substances which, given Spinoza’s metaphysics, is equally 
absurd. 
It seems that there is evidence to suggest that both readings (Martin’s and Koistinen’s) of 
EIP16 could be justified.  The question now becomes, how these different readings correspond 
with our understanding of human freedom as positive freedom outlined earlier in section one?  
Martin’s reading, that finite modes do not necessarily follow from the essence of the infinite 
intellect (God) and, therefore, are deterministic but not necessary, seems to offer more in the way 
of conventionally understood notions of freedom.  This is because finite modes could, arguably, 
express themselves in different ways under Martin’s metaphysics. Considering that our bodies 
are finite modes of being, Martin’s reading affords us a metaphysical determinism that is less 
strict.  Nonetheless, Koistinen’s strict necessitarianism seems to be more in line with the unique 
understanding of human freedom (freedom as forming clear and distinct ideas about the essence 
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of things, i.e. infinite modes of thought, i.e. God and Nature) we outlined earlier.  In the final 
section of this paper I will make my own contribution to the debate outlined in this section, 
arguing that Ethics should be read with a moderate necessitarian eye.  Furthermore, I suggest that 
the implications of such a reading may offer room for an argument that contends that Spinoza’s 
freedom is, in actuality, an example of negative liberty. 
Section III: A Defense of Moderate Necessitarianism and an Asylum for Negative Liberty 
Having to this point discussed Spinoza’s unique notion of freedom as intellectual 
emancipation from the bondage of the passions which is achieved through the formation of clear 
and distinct ideas concerning the divine nature, as well as the scholarly debate concerning the 
degree to which we may push Spinoza’s necessitarianism, it finally comes time to consider the 
latter in light of the former.  Does Spinoza’s conception of human freedom as outlined in Ethics 
and considered in Part I of this exercise represent a commitment to strict or moderate 
necessitarianism?  As we have already seen different readings of the Ethics support both 
arguments.  Ultimately, it seems as though Spinoza would have intended that his Ethics suggest a 
strict necessitarianism: that is, a system in which there can be only one single world.  
Nonetheless, I tend to side with Martin when he argues that, whether or not Spinoza intended to 
allow for such an understanding, a scrupulous consideration of the implications of EIP16 and 
E1P28 (which illuminate the causal relationship, or lack thereof, between infinite and finite 
modes) certainly suggests the possibility of multiple potential worlds.  In this section I will argue 
that Martin’s moderate necessitarian reading is the most appropriate way to understand the 
Ethics and Spinoza’s determinism.  To this end, I will consider critical responses to the argument 
grounding a strict necessitarian reading of Ethics on the “principle of perfection” outlined in the 
second section of this paper.  In demonstrating where this argument fails, I will show how a 
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multiplicity of plausible constitutions of finite modes is not counterintuitive to the perfection 
Spinoza demands.  Finally, I will show why Spinoza’s freedom can be construed as a type of 
“negative liberty.”  While the freedom Spinoza ostensibly argues for (freedom from the passions 
through the emendation of the intellect) is certainly an example of positive freedom, the freedom 
that he inadvertently allows for (that is, the freedom of finite modes to affect each other in a 
variety of different ways), actually represents a form of negative liberty. 
 Early in the first section of this paper I described Spinoza’s determinism as set out in 
Ethics Part I.  Quoting EIP25, I included Spinoza’s argument that “Particular things are nothing 
but affections of the modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and 
determinate way” (Spinoza 232).  From this I deduced that, since human beings are particular 
things (bodies being only particular expressions of finite modes), we are therefore determined to 
exist and express ourselves in determinate ways.  Nonetheless, taking into account Martin’s 
argument that there is nothing in Ethics that suggests a direct causal relationship between the 
infinite and the finite expressions of modes (as outlined in section two), one may argue that the 
way in which human beings alter the expressions of other finite modes isn’t strictly determined.  
This is, of course, problematic insofar as it contradicts Spinoza’s explicit claim in EIP33 which 
reads, “Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than 
is the case” (Spinoza 236).  Spinoza justifies the aforementioned claim, in part, on the basis of 
God’s absolute perfection, which suggests that any world other than the actual (any other 
constitution of finite modes) would be necessarily less perfect.  Nonetheless, if finite modes do 
not follow directly from God’s perfect nature (as infinite modes do), and if the only thing 
holding Spinoza’s system together is the “perfection principle,” then by showing where the 
“perfection principle” fails to logically demand the existence of a single, determined world, I will 
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consequently be able to show why one ought to read Ethics with the eye of a moderate 
necessitarian. 
 To summarize the key points of the argument based on the “perfection principle,” first we 
must understand that God is a being consisting of infinite attributes.  These attributes each 
express themselves in their own ways.  Consequently, God’s being perfect necessitates that every 
attribute express itself perfectly, a condition of perfection being existence.  “If all possible modes 
weren’t realized,” writes Koistinen, “then God would not exist” (296).  The argument seems 
extremely simple, and it is perhaps for this reason that some scholars find it to be unsatisfying.  
Just as infinite modes do not have any direct bearing on finite modes, finite modes, contend 
critics such as Martin, have no bearing on infinite modes or God.  Because infinite modes and 
finite modes are not directly related, which is argued by Spinoza in EIP28, it can be said that the 
finite modes that manifest in the actual world are actually contingent properties that are 
dependent upon other finite modes. 
Koistinen mentions the argument for contingency in his article and, while he doesn’t 
believe it to be valid, his discussion of it will help illuminate what I mean to say.  “The belief in 
contingent properties,” he writes, “is founded on the assumption that the properties of substances 
can be divided to those that somehow follow from the nature of the substance and to those that 
somehow depend on their interaction with other things” (303).  Under such conditions, infinite 
modes would necessarily follow from the one Substance (God) and, consequently, be strictly 
determined to exist as is.  Insofar as God is perfect, every mode following directly from his 
essence would, as Koistinen argues, necessarily exist.  In short, there could not be other possible 
worlds where the infinite modes are expressed in other ways.  This is not to say, however, that 
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the finite modes which, by their nature, are conditional and contingent, must exist in one fixed 
way, because they don’t follow directly from a perfect Substance.    
 To further my aforementioned argument against the “principle of perfection” and, hence, 
strict necessitarianism, I suggest that the mutability of finite modes does not necessarily 
undermine the perfection of the Divine.  Martin makes such an argument, quoting the Scholium 
of Lemma 7 of EIIP13 where Spinoza writes, “We thus see how a composite individual can be 
affected in many ways and yet preserve its nature… for since each one of its [the composite 
being (God)] is composed of several bodies, each single part can therefore, without any change 
in its nature, move with varying degrees of speed and consequently communicate its own motion 
to other parts with varying degrees of speed” (Spinoza 255).  What this long but necessary 
excerpt suggests is that finite modes can express themselves in a multiplicity of ways without 
compromising the infinite nature of God.  We must imagine a world of particular things (bodies, 
buildings, trees, animals, etc…) all of which influence each other in an assortment of means.  
Now, divorcing ourselves from a strictly deterministic Spinozist universe where God mandates 
exactly how these particular things influence each other, we can imagine, knowing what we now 
know about Martin’s original argument for moderate necessitarianism, the aforesaid argument 
for contingent properties, and the implications of L7S EIIP13, a world in which the 
aforementioned particular things could act on each other in infinitely many ways without any one 
resultant constitution of the finite modes being imperfect.   In his article Koistinen discredits the 
argument of contingent properties on the basis of the fact that the contingent properties (the finite 
modes) are “causally isolated.”  “Because Spinoza adhered to the principle of sufficient reason,” 
he writes, “[the statement] x could be different requires a specification of the circumstances in 
which x would have been different” (303).  In this sense, one would have to include the 
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conditional: “x would have been different, if ___” (303).  “However,” writes Koistinen, “it seems 
that when x is a causally isolated individual, there is no way to fill the blank in the antecedent” 
(303).  It is in this manner that he discredits the entire argument for contingent properties.  Here I 
contend that Koistinen’s dismissal is unjustified, for while x is causally isolated from the infinite 
modes and attributes of God, at least insofar as God has no direct causal bearing on its 
constitution (owing to EIP28), it is not necessarily causally isolated from other finite modes.  
This is what Martin has been arguing all along.  There are many different ways in which finite 
modes can causally affect each other, thereby producing multiple plausible worlds.  For example, 
a tree (x) could be cut down by a woodsman (y).  At the same time, applying Koistinen’s causal 
conditional: the tree (x) would have been different if the woodsman (y) breaks his axe.  There is 
nothing that logically suggests that the woodsman must cut down the tree, for Spinoza has 
unwittingly allowed in EIP28 for the disruption in the causal chain between finite modes and the 
divine nature.  Strictly speaking, men as particular things, acting solely on other particular things, 
could logically affect them in a variety of ways resulting in a variety of plausible worlds.  The 
resultant system is one of moderate necessitarianism. 
 Throughout all of this discussion I have not compromised Spinoza’s notion of human 
freedom as liberation from the passions, as I don’t think that notion is fundamentally 
incompatible with a moderate necessitarian reading.  We can still render the emotions active 
from a passive state while acknowledging the potential of finite modes to constitute themselves 
in different ways.  What I do believe has been compromised, however, is our understanding of 
Spinoza’s freedom as a purely positive freedom.  Recalling that positive freedom is “freedom to” 
rather than “freedom from” (negative liberty), it seemed at first that Spinoza’s system only 
allowed for the former insofar as one has the power to form clear and distinct perceptions, but 
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not freedom from the constraints of God’s strict determinism.  With our new conception of 
moderate necessitarianism in mind, I believe that we can justifiably say that the freedom Spinoza 
unintentionally allows for resembles negative freedom too.  I don’t want to go so far as to say 
that under such a system man has achieved free will, and if negative freedom demands a 
perfectly free will then I suppose I am not arguing for negative freedom in the strictest sense.  
Nonetheless, if particular things can influence a man to act in a variety of ways, and he can 
influence other particular things to act in a variety of ways, such a man is certainly free of the 
limitations imposed by a substance that demands that everything correspond to one single 
ordering.  To return to our example of the woodsman and the tree, suppose the woodsman leaves 
his axe outside through the winter.  Other finite modes, such as moisture and ice, might affect 
and weaken it, thereby causing it to break when the woodsman goes to fell the tree.  Conversely, 
he could have affected the axe differently by storing it inside, which would causally result in the 
tree being successfully cut.  When God doesn’t exercise absolute dominion over finite modes in 
a moderate necessitarian universe, other finite modes can, wittingly or unwittingly, change the 
way the world of finite, particular things is constituted.  Nothing logically demands that the 
world in which the tree is cut and the world in which the tree survives aren’t each equally 
plausible. 
 Ultimately, Spinoza seems to allow for a world in which there is both a semblance of 
colloquially understood notions of negative freedom, as well as more unique and philosophical 
conceptions of freedom rooted in the power of the intellect.  Perfection doesn’t necessitate a 
single ordering of finite modes, but only that the integrity of the system as whole endure.  As 
Martin writes, “Spinoza’s [reference to] ‘the face of the whole universe’ must [be understood] to 
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refer only to the continuous order of nature, not the totality of its ever-changing parts” (Martin 
64). Finite modes can change, and the divine can still be perfect. 
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